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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

FCK

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO /SP		X		
20	C/ACIS		X		
21	D/SOVA		X		
22					
	SUSPENSE		Date		

Remarks

STAT

State Dept. review completed

Executive Secretary

25 Apr 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

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Executive Registry
85- 1709

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

April 24, 1985

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Hardening Soviet Positions in NST

My staff, with Paul Nitze's, has recently compared Soviet positions in the first NST round to earlier Soviet positions in START and INF and the January talks with Gromyko. I thought you would be interested in a summary of areas in which the Soviets either hardened or changed their previous positions. (This is also being sent to Secretary Shultz.) Much of this Soviet positioning could, of course, be negotiating tactics and posturing. Still, in briefing Allies and Congress, it might be useful to note this Soviet hardening and contrast it to our greater flexibility in the talks.

The attached list covers many areas. The main ones are:

- o ABM research: Gromyko admitted in January that a ban on research is not verifiable, but in Geneva they are tying progress on nuclear weapons to a ban on SDI research.

- o Moscow ABM (Galosh): After being pressed by us, Gromyko agreed in January that the Moscow ABM is included in the term "space arms"; but in Geneva the Soviets exclude the system from "space strike weapons."

- o Linkage: The Soviets earlier linked reductions in START to US LRINF missile deployments; in Geneva they are linking progress in START to removal of such missiles and to "preventing an arms race in space", i.e., foregoing SDI.

- o INF Aircraft: The Soviets earlier suggested informally a willingness to accept narrow limitations on specific US aircraft; in Geneva they are including more types and hinting at taking into account aircraft on US carriers outside the Atlantic/Med region.

Ken

Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment:
As stated

cc: Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Casey

DCI
EXEC
REG

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Hardening Soviet Positions in NST Negotiations

Issue	Previous Position	Current Position
Defense & Space		
ABM research	Ban not verifiable (Jan. Shultz-Gromyko talks)	Ban SDI research
Moscow ABM (GALOSH)	Included in "Space Arms" (Jan. Shultz-Gromyko talks)	Explicitly excluded in their definition of a "space-strike" weapon
START		
Reductions in SNDVs and weapons	Specific numbers for SNDV limits and sub-limits (1982-1983 START)	No specific numbers
Linkage	Reductions in START linked to US LRINF missile deployments (1982-1983 START)	START progress linked both to INF and to defense/space issues
Cruise missiles over 600 km range	Preference for deployment ban, but willingness to consider permitting some ALCMs (1982-1983 START)	Total ban on all forms of cruise missiles over 600 km range

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INF

Soviet LRINF missile reductions in Europe	Reductions to 120 SS-20s with 360 warheads (1983 INF talks)	Reductions to UK/FR warhead levels (levels unspecified, but probably above 360)
Missile limits in Asia	Freeze on SS-20 deployment in Asia (1983 INF talks)	No limits on systems in Asia
INF aircraft	Soviet aircraft proposal can be narrowed to cover only US F-111, A-6, A-7 (1983, INF talks)	US F-4s, F-16s are to be included as well as US F-111, A-6 and A-7
Europe/Asia boundaries	European limits on SS-20s extend to 80^{0}E; for new systems, all systems within range of NATO targets are covered (1983 INF talks)	Discussion of specific boundaries awaits US acceptance of Soviet approach
US aircraft carriers	Aircraft on 2-3 US carriers in Atlantic/Med to be taken into account (1983 INF talks)	Aircraft on carriers in Pacific/Indian Oceans also are a threat

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